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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of voluntary information disclosure on firm value for a sample 
of Tunisian firms listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange between 2005 and 2007. The results of the study have 
shown that, in the Tunisian context, (1) Voluntary corporate disclosure has an effect on income smoothing 
since an increased level of voluntary disclosure allows a detection of income smoothing. (2) Voluntary 
corporate disclosure has an effect on firm value via income smoothing. Actually, the more the Tunisian 
companies voluntarily disclose information, the less chance will be for managers to smooth earnings since the 
information needed to detect any income smoothing is held by investors, which entails an amplified firm value. 
This finding contributes to the relevant literature, particularly in an emerging market context characterized by a 
scarcity of studies regarding how the marketplace perceives voluntary disclosure. The paper evaluates 
comprehensively the value relevance of overall voluntary disclosure to the market participants. Finally, this 
finding might be accepted as a signal to corporations to disclose more information to the stakeholders. Since an 
increased level of voluntary disclosure will enhance the firm value.  
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, income smoothing, firm value, emerging market, income. 
 
1. Introduction:  
In the recent years, several regulatory organizations have made efforts to ameliorate the disclosure strategy 
within companies so as to facilitate the process of decision making (OCDE 2015, SEC 2015, Law No. 2005-96 
of 18 October 2005-tunisia). 
Since 2005, information disclosure has taken more attention from regulatory organizations. Actually, Article 3 
(new) of Law No.2005-96 of October 18, 2005 indicates that Tunisian Companies making public offerings are 
required to file to the Financial Market Council and the Tunis Stock Exchange the agenda and the resolutions’ 
draft proposed by the Board of Executive, the financial statements, a discussion of the results of the activities,  
their future development, and eventually the changes in methods of preparation and presentation of financial 
statements, elements of internal control and audit report. 
The disclosure requirements have improved in 2008. Section 44 of the Decree of the Minister of Finance of 17 
September 2008 indicates that the annual reports of companies making public offerings must enclose 
information other than those required by the above section (e.g. the evolution of the company and its 
performances over the last five years, activities of the company concerning research and development, 
etc.)(Regulation of the Council on financial market on public offering Article 44, September 2008). 
Voluntary information disclosure has been the object of considerable attention in the literature. The majority of 
studies have sought the causes of voluntary disclosure. They have shown that voluntary disclosure depends on 
several variables linked to the company namely:  size, ownership structure, company’s debt and performance 
(Lapointe et al, 2005; Brako et al, 2006). Studies on the determinants have concluded that voluntary disclosure 
reduces, on one hand, information asymmetry (Ben Saada et al, 2010) and, on the other hand, agency costs 
(Mattoussiet al, 2006). 
Other studies have focused on the consequences of voluntary information disclosure. They have shown that 
voluntary disclosure can affect income smoothing since it facilitates its detection (Zhou and Lobo, 2001; 
Lapointe et al, 2005; Jans, 2005; Lamrani, 2010). Actually, higher levels of disclosure allow the investors to get 
more information, which help them detect income smoothing. Thus, to build a better image of the company in 
order to attract new investors, managers have no incentive to manage their earnings. 
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Income Smoothing may have an effect on the firm value. First, it may have a positive effect since it can affect 
the future cash flow or the perceived risk of the firm (Lapointe et al, 2005). Second, income smoothing can be 
considered as an opportunistic earnings management. So, since the firm value depends on its reported earnings, 
income smoothing may have a negative effect on its value (Lapointe et al, 2005).  
The main problematic of the current research paper stems from the paucity of empirical studies examining the 
impact of voluntary information disclosure on firm value in the Tunisian context. Therefore, the current study 
aims at studying the consequences of voluntary corporate disclosure in listed Tunisian firms, first, on income 
smoothing, and second, on firm value via income smoothing. 
2. Theoretical framework and research hypothesis 
In the existing literature, several theories such as the agency theory, the signalling theory, the information 
economics theory and positive accounting theory, have notably contributed to the analysis of the consequences 
of voluntary information disclosure. 
2.1. The impact of voluntary corporate disclosure on income smoothing 
There has been a paucity of research in the existing literature in respect of the impact of voluntary disclosure on 
income smoothing. According to Lapointe et al. (2005), increased voluntary disclosure of information enables 
investors to detect earnings smoothing thanks to the information they hold. And given that the major goal of 
managers is to attract new investors to increase the shares liquidity and the firm value, they have no incentive 
to manage earnings since smoothed earnings don’t reflect the firm’s transparency. 
2.1.1. Change in net income 
To smooth earnings, managers make accounting choices so as to affect earnings value (Piera, 2005). And since 
mangers smooth earnings to project an image of financial stability of the firm, it is likely that their target is the 
previous period’s earnings. Consequently, to test income smoothing it is necessary to specify income variation 
level from one year to another (Lapointe et al, 2005). In fact, higher variation leads to greater smoothed income 
amounts. 
 
Hypothesis 1: we predict a positive relationship between change in net income and income smoothing. 
 
2.1.2. Voluntary corporate disclosure 
The literature has shown that income smoothing is based on disclosure policy. Shipper (1998) demonstrated 
that companies which disclose more information are less likely to manage their income since increased 
transparency reduces information asymmetry and also helps to detect earnings management. 
Shipper (1989) and Jo and Kim (2007) concluded that there is a negative correlation between voluntary 
disclosure and income smoothing. Shaw (2003) found that there is a negative relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and income smoothing during good news years. Contrarily, the relation appears positive during bad 
news years. Lapointe et al. (2005) also found that this relation is negative, but not significant. 
 
Hypothesis 2: we predict a negative relationship between voluntary information disclosure and income 
smoothing. 
 
2.1.3. The interaction between change in net income and voluntary corporate disclosure 
This variable is used to test whether the effect of voluntary information disclosure on income smoothing is 
more pronounced in case of change in net income. Lapointe et al. (2005) found that this correlation is negative, 
but not significant. 
 
Hypothesis 3: we predict a negative correlation in the interaction between change I net income, voluntary 
corporate disclosure and income smoothing. 
 
Hence model n°1:  
Income smoothing = f (change in net income, voluntary corporate disclosure level, interaction 
between change in net income and voluntary corporate disclosure) 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.6, 2016 
 
155 
2.2. The consequences of voluntary corporate disclosure on firm value 
A small number of prior studies have investigated the impact of voluntary corporate disclosure on firm value 
(Lapointe et al, 2005). The literature suggests that income smoothing may affect firm value (Beaver, 
2002;Lapointe et al, 2005; Klibi and Matoussi, 2007). According to Lapointe et al. (2005), income smoothing 
can have a positive or a negative effect on firm value. First, it can have a positive effect since it affects either 
future cash flows or firm associated risk. Second, income smoothing can be considered as an opportunistic 
earnings management. And since the firm value depends on its reported earnings, income smoothing may have 
a negative effect on firm value (Lapointe et al,2005). 
 
2.2.1. Equity  
Lapointe et al. (2005) have shown that firm value depends on the firm’s equity and earnings. Hence, a higher 
level of equity shows the way to a greater company value. 
 
Hypothesis 4: we predict a positive relationship between equity and firm value (The company value increases 
in parallel with the equity level) 
 
2.2.2. Earnings 
Lapointe et al. (2005) affirm that higher earnings lead to an increased firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 5: we predict a positive relationship between earnings and company value. 
 
2.2.3. Income smoothing  
The firm value can vary depending on income smoothness which is also function of voluntary information 
disclosure. In fact, higher levels of information disclosure help the investors better detect income smoothing, 
which will cause an improved earnings quality. Consequently, earnings will be more pertinent to assess firm 
value. 
Lapointe et al. (2005) found that income smoothing has a negative but a non significant impact on firm value 
only for Swiss firms using international and American standards. Conversely, Klibi and Mattoussi (2007) 
confirmed this negative relation for French firms issuing new shares. 
 
Hence model n°2:  
Firm value = f (equity, earnings, income smoothing) 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1.Sample 
The initial sample of this study consisted of 50 Tunisian companies that are listed on the Tunis Stock 
Exchange. Firms that belong to the financial sector such as banks, insurances, and investment firms have been 
excluded mainly because the nature of these firms’regulations differs from other firms. We excluded, also, 
firms that don’t have an annual report. The final sample consists of 18 Tunisian firms listed on the Tunis Stock 
Exchange. The collected annual reports concern the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
3.2.Data Sources 
Data collection on the variables of our models was made from two data sources:  
-The annual reports available at the Financial Market Council  
-The websites of the Financial Market Council, the Tunis Stock Exchange and the Tustex (a website of firms 
‘news in the Tunis Stock exchange). 
The annual reports include, generally, financial statements (balance sheet, statement of cash flows, and 
thenotes), Board report and audit report. 
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3.3.Variables’ measures and definitions 
In what follows we will introduce appropriate measures to variables included in our two models. 
 
3.3.1. Variables studying the effect of voluntary corporate disclosure on income smoothing ( Model . 1)  
The dependent variable: income smoothing (PROVDEP) 
To measure this variable, we referred to the total provisions/depreciation. This variable depends primarily on 
the managers’ judgment and estimation and is, actually, one of the smoothing techniques. Managers use it to 
increase or decrease reported earnings. 
To control the size effect, the total provision/depreciation is multiplied by the logarithm of assets. This measure 
is the same as that used by Lapointe et al. (2005). 
 
Income smoothing = Total provisions/ depreciation * Ln ( Total assets) 
 
The independent variables: 
-Change in net income (∆NI): it is the change in annual net income exclusive of depreciation and provision, 
multiplied by the logarithm of assets. This is the same as that used by Lapointe et al. (2005). 
 
Change in net income = [(Net incomeN – Net income N-1) - depreciations/provisions]* Ln (Total assets) 
 
- Voluntary corporate disclosure (DISCORE): it is measured by the Botosan score (Botosan, 1997). This score 
was validated by several studies in various contexts. It is structured around five components, three of which 
relate to the financial information (summary of historical results, projected Information, management 
discussion and Analysis). A component is devoted to non-financial information, and another one to background 
information. We selected 63 items for non-commercial firms and 55 elements for commercial ones. 
Our disclosure score will be calculated as follows: 
 
Disclosure score i =  Firm’s total Score i /  Firm maximum disclosure Scorei 
 
- The interaction between change in net income and disclosure score (∆NI *DISCORE): this variable is used to 
test whether the effect of voluntary corporate disclosure on earnings smoothing is more pronounced in the 
presence of change in net income. 
 
Interaction between change in net income and disclosure score = change in net income * disclosure 
score 
 
Control variables: 
-  Capital Assets (CAPASSETS): according to Lapointe et al. (2005), an increased level of capital assets can 
affect income smoothing since managers use amortization to smooth earnings. Therefore, higher levels of 
capital assets, allow the managers to enhance smooth earnings. To measure this variable we used the logarithm 
of capital assets, multiplied by the logarithm of total assets.  
 
Capital assets = Ln (Total capital assets) * Ln (Total assets) 
 
- Revenues (REVENUES): this variable can affect income smoothing. In fact, when the revenue level increases, 
managers tend to reduce it by smoothing earnings. To measure this variable we referred to the logarithm of 
revenues multiplied by the logarithm of assets.  
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Revenues = Ln (Revenues) * Ln (Total assets) 
 
Accordingly, our model No.1 will be as follows:  
 
PROVDEPi,t = b0 + b1∆NIi,t + b2DISCOREi,t + b3∆NI *DISCOREi,t + b4CAPASSETSi,t+ b5REVENUESi,t+ ei,t 
 
With: 
PROVDEP:Provision/depreciation. 
∆NI:Change in net income.  
DISCORE:Voluntary corporate disclosure score. 
∆NI *DISCORE:Interaction between earnings variation and disclosure score (index). 
CAPASSETS:Total capital assets. 
REVENUS:Total revenues. 
 
3.3.2.Variables studying the effect of voluntary information disclosure on firm value via income smoothing ( 
Model.2) 
 
The dependent variable: firm’s market value(MVEQUITY) 
In this study, the firm value is measured by market capitalization (share price* total number of shares) 
multiplied by the logarithm of assets. 
 
Firm’s market value =  Market capitalization * Ln (Total assets) 
 
The independent variables: 
- Equity: to measure this variable we referred to the value of equity multiplied by the logarithm of assets 
(Lapointe et al, 2005). 
 
Equity = Equity *Ln ( Total Assets) 
 
-Earnings: they are measured by multiplying the earnings by the logarithm of assets. This is the same as that 
used by Lapointe et al. (2005).  
 
Earnings = Earnings * Ln ( Total Assets) 
 
- Income smoothing (PROVDEP): this variable is measured by the total provision/depreciation. To control the 
size effect, the total provision/depreciation is multiplied by the logarithm of assets. 
 
Income smoothing = Total provisions/ depreciations * Ln ( Total Assets) 
 
Our model No.2 will be, hence, as follows:  
 
MVEQUITYi,t= b0 + b1EQUITYi,t + b2EARNINGSi,t + b3PROVDEPi,t + ei,t 
With: 
MVEQUITY: Firm’s market value. 
EQUITY: Total equity. 
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EARNINGS: Total earnings. 
PROVDEP: provision/depreciation. 
 
4. Analysis and discussion of results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we will analyze the descriptive statistics of variables used in both research models. 
 
4.1.1. Descriptive analysis of the level of voluntary information disclosure 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive analysis of the disclosure score 
Panel A : 2005   
 Number of firms Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Disclosure score       18 0,2699      0,0556 0,1727 0,3636 
Panel B :  2006 
 Number of firms Mean Standard deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Disclosure score       18 0,2963      0,0664   0,1909 0,4206 
Panel C : 2007 
 Number of firms Mean Standard deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Disclosure score       18   0,3208      0,0765    0,2187 0,5000 
 
Panels A,B and C present the evolution of the disclosure score over the period 2005 and 2007. The mean 
aggregate score has increased from 0.2699 in 2005 to 0.3208 in 2007 showing an improvement in the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by Tunisian firms. Therefore, firms allocate more value to their disclosure strategy by 
communicating voluntarily more information. However, this voluntary disclosure remains modest. 
4.1.2. Descriptive analysis of other variables 
Table 2 presents the descriptive analysis of variables used in both research models other than the level of 
voluntary information disclosure. 
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          Table A.2: Descriptive Analysis of variables other than Disclosure score 
 Number of firms Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PROVDEP  54 23,8149 71,9403 0,129183 345,4561 
∆NI 54 -25,0178 77,1232 -354.6029 7.1700 
∆NI *DISCORE 54 -9,1817 29,9316 -138,6175 2,3331 
CAPASSETS  54 2,7563 1,7216 0,7771 9,0268 
REVENUES  54 3,1014 1,8776 0,8702 9,3767 
MVEQUITY  54 199,9265 368,9075 9,255007 1918,865 
EQUITY  54 96,6971 200,1642 -6,0376 1083,573 
EARNINGS  54 37,54877 92,652 -0,0099 408,3884 
With: 
PROVDEP: Provision/depreciation. 
∆NI: Change in net income.  
DISCORE: Voluntary corporate disclosure score. 
∆NI *DISCORE: Interaction between earnings variation and disclosure score (index). 
CAPASSETS: Total capital assets. 
REVENUS: Total revenues. 
MVEQUITY: Firm’s market value. 
EQUITY: Total equity. 
EARNINGS: Total earnings. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis  
Before making multivariate analysis, it is necessary to detect any problem of multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables. The statistical results (not reported in this paper) show that there is no significant 
correlation between these variables. 
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4.2.1. The effect of voluntary corporate disclosure on income smoothing 
                       Table A.3: Results of linear regression Model.1 
Model n°1 : PROVDEPi,t = b0 + b1∆NIi,t + b2DISCOREi,t + b3∆NI *DISCOREi,t +  b4CAPASSETSi,t +  
b5REVENUESi,t + ei,t 
Variables Coefficient bi T Signification 
Constante 0,2856 6,25 0,000*** 
∆NI -1,1772 -10,35 0,000*** 
DISCORE -0,7488 -4,98 0,000*** 
∆NI *DISCORE 2.7311 8,27 0,000*** 
CAPASSETS -0,0517 -0,71 0,484 
REVENUES 0,1149 1,46 0,156 
R² = 0,9240 
PROVDEPi,t = 0,2856 - 1,1772 ∆NIi,t  - 0,7488 DISCOREi,t + 2.7311 ∆NI *DISCOREi,t - 0,0517 
CAPASSETSi,t + 0,1149 REVENUESi,t 
The results of linear regression on the effect of voluntary corporate disclosure on income smoothing presented 
in Table 3 indicate that the variance of income smoothing  is explained by the change in net income, the level 
of voluntary information disclosure and the level of voluntary information disclosure in case of a grand 
earnings variation. 
In point of fact, the results show that, contrary to hypothesis H1, which states that there is a positive 
relationship between change in net income and income smoothing, the change in net income is negatively and 
significantly associated with income smoothing ( b1 = -1.177 and p =0.000). This is explained by the fact that 
Tunisian firms seem not to use the provisions/depreciations to smooth earnings. 
The level of voluntary information disclosure appears to be negatively associated with income smoothing (b2= -
0, 7488 and p=0,000). This confirms hypothesis H2 which states that there is a negative relationship between 
voluntary corporate disclosure and income smoothing. It seems, therefore, that Tunisian firms tend to reduce 
smoothing when they voluntarily disclose information. Indeed, and since the managers’ major goal is to 
maximize the firm value, they have no incentive to smooth earnings because voluntary disclosure allows 
investors to detect income smoothing.  
Finally, results in Table 3 indicate that the interaction between change in net income and income smoothing has 
a positive and significant effect on income smoothing (b3= 2.7311 and p=0,000).This result contradicts 
hypothesis H3. Therefore, in presence of change in net income, firms smooth earnings even if the level of 
disclosure is important. 
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As to control variables, and contrary to our expectations, we detect a negative and non significant relationship 
between capital assets and income smoothing (b4= -0,05170and p=0,484). A non significant and positive 
association between earnings and income smoothing (b5=0,1149and p=0,156). These results show that capital 
assets and earnings have no effect on income smoothing within Tunisian firms. This result can be explained by 
contextual differences. 
 
4.2.2. The effect of income smoothing on firm’s value (Model n°2) 
                 Table A.4:Results of linear regression Model. 2 
Variables Coefficient bi T Signification 
Constante 0,0000 -0,000 1,000 
EQUITY 0,1638 1,84 0,066* 
EARNINGS 0,9354 13,19 0,000*** 
PROVDEP -0,2376 -2,82 0,005*** 
R² = 0,9458 
MVEQUITYi,t =  0,1638 EQUITYi,t + 0,9354 EARNINGSi,t – 0,2376 PROVDEPi,t 
 
The results in Table 4 show that the change infirm value is explained by equity, earnings and income 
smoothing. 
The statistics in Table 4 suggest a positive and significant relationship between the level of equity and firm 
value (b1=0,1638and p=0,066). This result supports Hypothesis H4, which states that firm value increases in 
parallel with the level of equity. Indeed, equity is the pledge of shareholders and creditors. Moreover, a more 
important level of equity leads to a larger distribution of dividends. Therefore, firm value depends on the firm’s 
own equity.  
According to Table 4, we also note that earnings have a positive and significant effect on firm value 
(b2=0,9354and p=0,000). This result confirms hypothesis H5 which states that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between earnings and firm value. The more the equity is important, the greater the demand for the 
company’s shares and the greater its value will be. 
Finally, we note that income smoothing has a negative and significant effect on firm value (b3= -0,2376and 
p=0,005). This result supports hypothesis H6 which states that income smoothing is negatively associated with 
company value. It seems, therefore, that investors are able to detect smoothing. Actually, when the investors 
recognize that the reported earning is smoothed, they will no longer have confidence in its published statistics, 
and, therefore, they will no more be interested in its shares, which will adversely affect the firm value. 
From the foregoing, we can assemble our results as follows: 
Voluntary corporate disclosure within Tunisian firms has a direct effect on income smoothing since an 
increased level of voluntary disclosure results in a reduction of income smoothing. 
Voluntary information disclosure has an indirect effect on firm value via income smoothing. Indeed, higher 
levels of voluntary information disclosure within Tunisian firms diminish the value of smoothed earnings since 
Model n°2 : MVEQUITYi,t= b0 + b1EQUITYi,t + b2EARNINGSi,t + b3PROVDEPi,t + ei,t 
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investors possess the information allowing them to detect income smoothing, and increase the firm value since 
earnings reflect the firm’s transparency.  
 
5. Discussion 
The main objectives of this research consist in determining the factors that influence the policy of voluntary 
disclosure of information within the Tunisian companies, and to study, subsequently, the consequences of such 
disclosure on the value of the company via smoothing of benefit.  
To test the validity of these assumptions, we used the method of multiple linear regression. The results relating 
to the model n°1 show that the family and the concentration of ownership have a significant effect on the 
voluntary level of disclosure, while the institutional ownership presents a non-significant effect on the 
voluntary level of disclosure. 
The significant relation between the concentration of the ownership and the voluntary level of disclosure can be 
explained by two reports. Initially, in the presence of concentrated ownership, the shareholders can be incited 
to reveal more information in order to improve the liquidity of the titles and to maximize the value of the 
company. The company size is positively and significantly associated with the voluntary level of disclosure of 
information, which leads to conclude that the Tunisian companies of big size tend to voluntarily reveal more 
information. This can be explained by their capacity to support the costs of disclosure and their will to be 
distinguished from the smallest and least profitable companies.  
The results also show that, the performance and the debt have a non-significant effect on the voluntarily level 
of disclosure of information. It would seem that they don’t determine the voluntary policy of disclosure of the 
Tunisian companies. 
In addition, the results of model n°2 indicate that the deviation of the benefit is negatively and significantly 
associated with the smoothing of benefit. According to these results, the Tunisian companies do not use the 
provisions /depreciations to smooth the result. It would seem they tend to lessen the smoothing of the result 
when they voluntarily reveal more information. Indeed, the major target of the leaders is to maximize the value 
of the company, so it’s not beneficial to smooth the result because the voluntary disclosure of information 
makes it possible to the investors to detect the smoothing decrease the value of the company. 
The results also show that the interaction between the deviation of the benefit and the smoothing of the results 
have a positive and significant effect on the smoothing of the result. This result can be explained by the fact 
that the effect of the voluntary disclosure on the smoothing is not accentuated by the presence of the deviation 
of the benefit. 
Finally, the results related to the model n°3 show that the relation between the level of the shareholders’ equity 
and the value of the company is positive and significant. Indeed, the shareholder’s equity constitutes the pledge 
of the shareholders and the creditors. Consequently, the value of the company depends on the shareholders’ 
equity that the company has. The results show that the smoothing of the result is negatively associated with the 
value of the company tends to increase when the leaders do not smooth the result.  
By what precedes, we achieve the idea that, first,  in the Tunisian context, the voluntary disclosure of 
information is explained by the concentration of the ownership and the company size. The theory of agency 
does not explain the voluntary disclosure of information in the Tunisian context considering the nature of the 
structure of the Tunisian companies formed by family businesses. Second, the voluntary disclosure has an 
indirect effect on the value of the company via smoothing of benefits. Indeed, the more the company 
voluntarily reveals information, the less the value of the smoothed results will be. Investors have information 
which allows them detect the smoothing of the result. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This research work is, to our awareness, the first to study the consequences of voluntary disclosure in the 
Tunisian context. The results seem to be interesting and could serve as a tool for decision making. 
First, the results of this study show that voluntary information disclosure in Tunisian firms has a direct effect 
on income smoothing since an increased level of voluntary disclosure facilitate a detection of income 
smoothing. 
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Second, voluntary corporate disclosure has an indirect effect on firm value via income smoothing. Indeed, the 
more the Tunisian firms voluntarily disclose information, the less opportunity will be for managers to smooth 
earnings, which will enhance the firm value. 
Finally we conclude that, the main finding of the study is that voluntary disclosure is value‐relevant for firm 
value. This implies that market participants value voluntary disclosure. The more information firms disclose 
voluntarily, the higher value they have in the eyes of investors. Therefore, this finding might be accepted as a 
signal to corporations to disclose more information to the stakeholders.  
However, the finding has some limitations. First, it should be noted that the sample is reduced. Our sample is 
limited to 18 companies which correspond to the number of companies for which an annual report is available. 
In Future research, and for a better generalization of results, the sample could be expanded. In addition, other 
measures of income smoothing, such as accruals, can be used since Tunisian managers seem not to use the 
provision/depreciation to smooth earnings. This measure necessitates information which is not obviously 
available in the Tunisian context. Future research can eventually test the effect of an increased level of 
voluntary corporate disclosure on other consequences of the financial market (e.g. predictions of investors). 
Finally, annual reports have been used as the sole source of data gathering, others such as web sites press 
releases, prospectuses could be used in future studies. 
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